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Islam 632–661 CE: The Wars of Apostasy and Bloody Succession

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When Muhammad died in 632 C.E., Islam did not glide into a peaceful “golden age” of spiritual reflection. The story that Muslims often tell is simple: the Prophet finished his mission, his companions wisely chose successors, and the community spread the faith through disciplined justice and piety. The real record is brutally different.

Within months of Muhammad’s death, much of Arabia was in open revolt. Tribes that had mouthed allegiance to him while he lived refused to send money to Medina once he was gone. Rival prophets arose. Local leaders said, “We pledged to Muhammad, not to Abu Bakr.” The response from the new caliph was not persuasion but terror. Those who refused the new regime’s demands were branded “apostates,” hunted, crucified, burned, and enslaved.

From 632 to 661, Islam’s first generation did four things at once: crushed dissent inside Arabia, exploded outward in conquest from Persia to Egypt, fell into savage internal corruption, and finally turned its own swords on itself in civil war. Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali were not quiet saints meditating over Scripture; they were political operators, warlords, and faction leaders who shed rivers of blood while claiming that Muhammad’s religion was “perfected.”

Jehovah’s Word gives us a different picture of what His congregation looks like: shepherds who serve willingly, not by compulsion; overseers chosen for gentleness and self-control; holy ones who spread the Gospel by preaching and sacrificial love, not by seizing tax rolls and burning opponents alive. The first thirty years of Islam after Muhammad show clearly that whatever spirit guided the caliphs, it was not the Spirit of the God who revealed Himself in Christ.

Abu Bakr’s Reign of Terror Against “Apostates”

When Muhammad died, there was no clear written document naming a successor. In the confusion, leading companions gathered in a hall of the Ansar called Saqifah. Emotions ran high. The Ansar felt that they had sheltered Muhammad in Medina and deserved leadership. The Qurayshi emigrants argued that rule should remain in Muhammad’s tribe.

In that heated meeting Abu Bakr was pushed forward as a compromise. He was Muhammad’s close friend, Aisha’s father, and one of the earliest converts. ‘Umar dramatically grabbed his hand and gave him bay‘ah, and others followed. Ali and some of the Prophet’s family were absent or hesitant, sowing seeds of resentment that would later erupt into Shia–Sunni division. But for the moment, Abu Bakr became the first caliph, “successor” of Allah’s messenger.

His very first crisis was massive. Many tribes that had submitted to Muhammad did not see their pledge as a permanent covenant with an institution. They saw it as a personal agreement with a charismatic war leader. With him dead, they assumed the arrangement had ended. Some simply stopped sending zakat (the obligatory alms-tax) to Medina. Others returned to their older ways or followed charismatic figures like Musaylima, Sajah, and Tulayha, who claimed prophethood for themselves.

Abu Bakr reacted with fury. For him, refusal to send money to Medina was not a tax dispute; it was apostasy. If anyone tried to separate prayer from zakat—still claiming Islam but refusing financial submission—he considered them rebels against Allah. He stated openly that he would fight those who differentiate between prayer and alms and that he would pursue even those who had once given Muhammad something as small as a rope for a camel.

This marked a decisive shift. Under Muhammad, people had been told “there is no compulsion in religion” in Meccan days, then later were ordered to fight until unbelievers submitted or paid. Under Abu Bakr, even tribal groups that only wanted to renegotiate taxation were treated as enemies of Allah. Islam was now formally a one-way door: enter, and you cannot leave without risking your life.

Abu Bakr’s reign lasted barely two years, yet in that short time he unleashed the Ridda Wars—campaigns against “apostates” that drenched Arabia in Muslim-on-Muslim blood. He did not behave like a gentle elder guiding a congregation; he behaved like a ruler terrified that his new state would disintegrate, willing to kill thousands to prevent it. That is not how Jehovah’s true shepherds act. The Lord Jesus used no earthly coercion to keep disciples. When some turned away from Him because His sayings were hard, He asked the twelve whether they too wanted to go; He did not threaten them with swords.

Khalid ibn al-Walid: Sword of Allah or Psychopath?

The man who did much of Abu Bakr’s dirty work was Khalid ibn al-Walid.

Khalid had been one of Quraysh’s best generals. At Uhud he had led the cavalry maneuver that turned initial Muslim success into defeat. Later, after Hudaybiyyah, he saw that Muhammad’s star was rising and “converted.” Muhammad quickly recognized his military value and used him as a hammer against opponents. Abu Bakr went further, turning Khalid into his chief enforcer in the Ridda Wars.

Islamic tradition gives Khalid the glorious title “Sayf Allah,” the Sword of Allah. When we look at the specific incidents preserved about him, a better label would be “licensed killer.” His record during and just after Muhammad’s lifetime is marked by cruelty, rashness, and sexual opportunism.

One early case, while Muhammad was still alive, involved the tribe of Banu Jadhima. Muhammad sent Khalid to call them to Islam. When he arrived, they were confused and frightened, unsure whether the political winds had turned completely in Muhammad’s favour. They reportedly said “we have become sabians” rather than using the exact phrase of the shahada. The ambiguity angered Khalid. Despite their attempts to show peaceful intent, he ordered his men to seize them.

According to the sources, he and his troops killed many of the men and captured women and property, even though these people had not fought him. When word reached Muhammad, he raised his hands and said, “O Allah, I disavow what Khalid has done.” Yet he did not strip Khalid of command or execute him for murdering those who were trying to submit. He merely sent another companion to pay some blood money. Khalid learned a clear lesson: even if he overstepped, the worst he could expect was a mild rebuke.

His most notorious act under Abu Bakr came against Malik ibn Nuwayra. Malik was a tribal leader who had been a Muslim under Muhammad and had collected zakat. After the Prophet’s death, he hesitated to send funds to Medina; some reports say he wanted to hold them until matters were clearer, others that he recognized a claimant prophetess, Sajah. Khalid captured Malik and his men. Despite their profession of Islam and calls to prayer, Khalid accused them of apostasy.

The accounts say that in a cold desert night he ordered his troops to bind the men and then gave the chilling command that the “stoves be heated”—a coded order to execute. Malik and others were beheaded. That same night, Khalid saw Malik’s wife, Layla bint al-Minhal, renowned for her beauty. He took her as a wife or concubine at once, without waiting the prescribed period to ensure she was not pregnant. The juxtaposition is stark: a man’s head rolling in the dust, his widow in the killer’s bed.

‘Umar, hearing of this, was enraged. He called Khalid a murderer and demanded that Abu Bakr dismiss him and punish him. Abu Bakr refused. He claimed that Khalid had “interpreted and erred,” that he would not sheathe the sword that Allah had drawn. That phrase contributed to Khalid’s title as Sword of Allah. In reality it meant that a man who executed other Muslims and slept with their widows on the same day was above the law.

When judging character, this matters. Jehovah’s servants in Scripture are not flawless, but when David arranged Uriah’s death and took his wife, Jehovah sent Nathan to condemn him. David repented deeply and bore severe consequences. In Islam’s foundational generation, a man who did something disturbingly similar was protected and glorified. That is not the mark of a community guided by the true God.

Ridda Wars: Mass Crucifixions and Burned Alive

The Ridda Wars were not a tidy campaign against a single organized foe. They were a series of brutal clashes scattered across the peninsula. Some tribes had followed false prophets like Musaylima in Yamama or Tulayha in Najd. Others simply wanted to break Medina’s grip. Abu Bakr’s approach never meaningfully distinguished between them. If you refused obedience and zakat, you were “ridda”—apostate.

Battles were fierce. The fight against Musaylima at Yamama cost thousands of Muslim lives, including many Qur’an reciters, forcing later codification efforts. But it was after the battles that the cruelty of the new regime became most obvious.

Sources describe captured opponents being crucified—nailed or tied to crosses or palm trunks—left as spectacles until they died or nearly died. Others were burned. One particularly revealing case involves a man called al-Fuja‘a (or al-Fuja’a al-Sulami). Accounts differ on details, but the core is consistent. Al-Fuja‘a came to Abu Bakr asking for weapons to fight enemies of Islam. Abu Bakr trusted him, armed him, and sent him out. Instead, he used those weapons to plunder indiscriminately, perhaps killing fellow Muslims.

When reports returned, Abu Bakr summoned him. Once he was in Medina’s power, the caliph ordered a gruesome execution. A pile of wood was prepared in an open area, al-Fuja‘a was bound, and the fire was lit beneath him. He was burned alive.

This is not an isolated story. Early Muslims themselves debated whether it was lawful to execute people by burning, in light of a statement attributed to Muhammad that no one should punish with fire except Allah. Abu Bakr’s actions show that, when enraged or politically threatened, he was ready to ignore such sayings.

Jehovah’s Word, by contrast, restrains human cruelty. Capital punishment under the Law was generally carried out by stoning in a community context or by the sword, not by inventive torture. The Torah explicitly forbade passing children through fire to Molech, and the prophets condemned kings who burned people alive. In the New Testament, the congregation is not a state at all; it does not wield the sword to punish apostasy or heresy. Those who depart from the faith are to be warned, lovingly disciplined, and, if unrepentant, treated as outsiders—not crucified or burned.

The Ridda Wars reveal Islam’s true nature once it had power but lost its founding prophet. Instead of turning to the written Word for guidance (which they did not yet even have in a stable form), the leaders relied on force. “Unity” was enforced by terror. Those who wanted to define their relationship to the new regime differently were labeled traitors to Allah and given the cruelest possible deaths.

When Muslims today speak of the “rightly guided caliphs” and portray the Ridda Wars as a necessary purging of rebellion, they are normalizing behavior that by biblical standards is monstrous. A faith that must crucify and burn its own to stay intact is not the congregation of the living God.

Umar’s Conquests: From Persia to Egypt in Ten Years

Abu Bakr died in 634 C.E., reportedly of illness, and before his death he bypassed the community’s choice by unilaterally designating ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab as his successor. ‘Umar had been a harsh opponent of Muhammad who later converted and became one of his most forceful companions. Under his rule, Islam changed from a regional power into an imperial engine.

In roughly a decade, armies under Umar’s authority smashed the two great empires that had dominated the Near East for centuries: the Byzantine (Eastern Roman) Empire in the Levant and the Sassanian Empire in Persia. The pace and scale were astonishing.

In Syria and Palestine, Muslim forces under commanders like Khalid ibn al-Walid and Abu ‘Ubayda defeated Byzantine armies at battles such as Ajnadayn and, most decisively, Yarmouk around 636. The victory at Yarmouk effectively ended Byzantine control over greater Syria. Cities such as Damascus, Homs, and Jerusalem eventually fell, often after negotiated terms that imposed jizya and granted limited protection to Christian populations.

Jerusalem’s capture is often romanticized. ‘Umar himself traveled there to accept surrender. Later Muslim tradition depicts him entering humbly, praying outside Christian churches to avoid setting a precedent for seizure, and granting a “covenant” to the city’s Christians. Lost beneath that soft-focused story is the hard reality: Jerusalem had been taken by force; Christians now lived under a new overlord who believed their faith was false and their books corrupted. They could keep their churches and crosses only by paying tribute and accepting inferiority.

In the east, Muslim forces under Sa‘d ibn Abi Waqqas and others fought the Persians. The battle of al-Qadisiyyah around 636 broke Sassanian power in Iraq. The capital, Ctesiphon (al-Mada’in), fell soon after, with its famed wealth plundered and sent to Medina. Over the next few years, the entire heartland of the Persian Empire—Mesopotamia, Khuzistan, Fars—was overrun. The Zoroastrian ruling class was shattered; many nobles converted to Islam to preserve status, while common people gradually followed under social and fiscal pressure.

In Egypt, ‘Amr ibn al-‘As led Muslim troops across the Sinai and down the Nile, capturing key fortresses such as Babylon (near modern Cairo) and eventually Alexandria. The Coptic Christians, long mistreated by Byzantine authorities, sometimes preferred Muslim political control to Greek theology; but whatever temporary relief they felt from imperial abuse, they soon discovered that their new masters brought a different set of burdens: jizya, dhimmi status, and constraints on public witness.

Throughout these campaigns, ‘Umar set policies that would shape Islamic rule. He ordered that Jews and Christians could not remain on equal footing with Muslims in Arabia. Reports say he expelled Jewish and Christian communities from the Hijaz in direct application of Muhammad’s dying command that “two religions shall not remain in the Arabian Peninsula.” He established the pattern in newly conquered lands: Muslims held political and military power; local Christians and Jews paid jizya, kept their worship under restrictions, and knew that their safety depended on the caliph’s favor.

Some Muslim sources praise ‘Umar for personal austerity: patched clothes, simple living, occasional toughness with his own governors. That may be true in part. But righteousness in Jehovah’s eyes is not measured by a leader’s simple diet. It is measured by conformity to His revealed will. No amount of humble outward lifestyle can whitewash the fact that under ‘Umar, Islam spread by the sword across lands whose inhabitants had never seen Muhammad, heard him preach, or freely chosen his message. They yielded because armies came, not because Scripture persuaded them.

In contrast, the book of Acts shows the Gospel spreading without military conquest. Paul did not arrive in cities with legions; he arrived with scrolls and the power of the Word. When he and other apostles were persecuted, they did not form militias; they endured suffering and preached all the more. ‘Umar’s conquests may impress military historians, but they bear no likeness to the advance of Jehovah’s Kingdom in the New Testament.

Uthman’s Corruption and Murder in His Own Home

When ‘Umar was stabbed by a Persian slave in 644, he set up a council of six leading men to choose the next caliph. After internal maneuvering, they settled on ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan, an elderly companion from the wealthy Umayyad clan and twice a son-in-law of Muhammad. His reign, from 644 to 656, exposed another rot in the supposedly golden early community: nepotism and corruption at the top.

Uthman’s pattern was consistent. He favored his own clan. He appointed Umayyad relatives and loyalists to powerful governorships across the expanding empire. Mu‘awiya, already governor of Syria, retained and strengthened his base. Al-Walid ibn ‘Uqba, his half-brother, took Kufa. ‘Abdullah ibn Sa‘d ibn Abi Sarh, once a scribe of Muhammad accused of tampering with revelation and later pardoned, received Egypt. Marwan ibn al-Hakam, a cousin, became his influential secretary and adviser.

Under these governors, local populations often suffered. Taxes were heavy, Arab soldiers behaved arrogantly, and non-Arab converts were treated as inferior. Complaints multiplied. Delegations came to Medina from Kufa, Basra, and Egypt, presenting petitions against Uthman’s appointees. At first he made promises to reform, but then he quietly reappointed the same men or similar ones. Trust eroded.

Meanwhile, Uthman himself lived more lavishly than his predecessors. He expanded the mosque in Medina into his family’s property, allegedly compensating some but angering others. He gifted large sums from the state treasury to his relatives. In the eyes of many early Muslims, the modesty that had characterized some of Muhammad’s closest companions was gone. The caliphate looked increasingly like a family monarchy.

One of Uthman’s most consequential acts was his handling of the Qur’an. With Muslim troops from different regions reciting different versions in battle and argument breaking out, he ordered an official recension based on the memories and copies of a chosen group in Medina. Once that master text was produced, he commanded that all other codices be burned. This act may have been administratively practical, but it meant that variant readings that had circulated among companions were suppressed by fire. Even within Islamic tradition, there is unease about how many variants were destroyed.

Discontent eventually turned into rebellion. Groups from Egypt, Kufa, and Basra converged on Medina, demanding that Uthman step down or at least dismiss corrupt governors. After wavering, he refused. The city became tense. Companions chose sides. Ali, Talha, and Zubair all tried to mediate at various points, but suspicion ran deep—especially because of a letter, allegedly from Uthman or his secretary, ordering punitive measures against the Egyptian rebels once they left. When they intercepted a messenger with this letter, they felt betrayed and returned in fury.

The rebels besieged Uthman in his own house. For days he was cut off, though some food and water reached him. He continued to insist that he would not give up the position entrusted to him. Finally, a group of insurgents broke in and murdered him while he was reading the Qur’an. His wife Naila tried to protect him and lost fingers to a sword. His blood stained the pages before him.

Here is the “rightly guided” community barely twenty-four years after Muhammad’s death: a caliph killed in his own home by disgruntled Muslims, accused of favoritism and betrayal, over a book that was still being standardized. This is not the picture of a congregation walking peacefully in the light of Jehovah’s Spirit. It is the picture of a political project tearing itself apart as greed, tribal loyalty, and wounded honor collide.

Aisha’s War on Ali: Battle of the Camel

Uthman’s murder created a vacuum. Many in Medina turned to Ali ibn Abi Talib, Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law, long respected for his bravery and knowledge. After initial hesitation, Ali agreed to accept the bay‘ah and became the fourth caliph. But his authority was contested from the beginning.

Two powerful groups emerged against him.

On one front, Mu‘awiya, governor of Syria and Uthman’s relative, refused to recognize Ali until Uthman’s killers were punished. Using the slogan of vengeance for Uthman, he consolidated his own position and prepared for confrontation.

On another front, a surprising figure raised her voice: Aisha, Muhammad’s widow, the same Aisha whose marriage at nine and involvement in hadith we have already seen. She, along with senior companions Talha and Zubair, argued that Ali had been slow or unwilling to bring Uthman’s killers to justice. They framed their opposition as a moral stand: the community could not move forward until the blood of the third caliph was avenged.

Aisha journeyed to Basra, riding in a howdah on a camel, rallying support. The image is unforgettable: the “Mother of the Believers” at the center of a political movement, publicly opposing the man who was now caliph. Crowds gathered around her, seeing in her a living link to Muhammad and interpreting her anger as righteous.

Ali followed, trying to negotiate. Initially there were signs of possible agreement. But factions interested in war—perhaps including some who had taken part in Uthman’s murder and now feared retribution—sabotaged the talks. Skirmishes escalated into a full-scale battle outside Basra in 656, known as the Battle of the Camel.

The fighting was fierce. Aisha’s camel became the symbolic center of her army. As long as it stood, her side held together. Men died trying to protect the animal and the howdah; others died trying to bring it down. When Ali’s forces finally hamstrung the camel and it collapsed, the battle turned decisively. Talha and Zubair were killed. Thousands of Muslims on both sides died at the hands of fellow Muslims.

Ali ordered that Aisha be treated with respect. She was escorted back to Medina and effectively retired from political life. But the damage could not be undone. The blood of Uthman, the blood on Ali’s hands from this battle, and the bitterness of defeated factions deepened divisions. Mu‘awiya still refused allegiance. Within a few years, further conflict at Siffin and the rise of the Kharijites would plunge Islam into even more violent fragmentation.

For those who claim that Islam’s early decades were a model of unity and justice, the Battle of the Camel is an embarrassment. It shows Muhammad’s favorite wife leading an armed challenge against the man many believe should have been his successor from the beginning. It shows companions who had once stood shoulder to shoulder in Muhammad’s mosque now hacked to pieces over political grievances. It shows that the supposed “brotherhood” of the early ummah fractured easily once the charismatic founder was gone.

By contrast, the apostolic congregation in the New Testament certainly faced disputes—over Hebrew and Greek widows, over circumcision, over leadership questions. But those disputes were addressed through councils, teaching, and submission to the written Word and to the apostles’ inspired decisions. There is no parallel to Aisha riding at the head of an army against Peter or Paul. Where Christians fell into political violence centuries later, they did so in disobedience to the pattern of the first century. Islam fell into such violence immediately, with its most revered figures at the center.

The period from 632 to 661 therefore shatters the myth of a gentle, guided Islamic dawn. Abu Bakr’s terror campaigns against “apostates,” Khalid’s murderous zeal, crucifixions and burnings, Umar’s rapid conquests by the sword, Uthman’s nepotism and bloody end, and Aisha’s war against Ali at the Battle of the Camel all testify that the religion Muhammad left behind did not naturally produce peace, holiness, or concord. It produced empire, coercion, and civil war. That fruit reveals the tree. Whatever Islam’s later philosophers said, its actual foundations are soaked in the blood of those who dared to resist its rule or even question its leaders.

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About the Author

EDWARD D. ANDREWS (AS in Criminal Justice, BS in Religion, MA in Biblical Studies, and MDiv in Theology) is CEO and President of Christian Publishing House. He has authored over 220+ books. In addition, Andrews is the Chief Translator of the Updated American Standard Version (UASV).

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